Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Formalised knowledge systems, including universities and research institutes, are important for contemporary societies. They are, however, also arguably failing humanity when their impact is measured against the level of progress being made in stimulating the societal changes needed to address challenges like climate change. In this research we used a novel futures-oriented and participatory approach that asked what future envisioned knowledge systems might need to look like and how we might get there. Findings suggest that envisioned future systems will need (...) to be much more collaborative, open, diverse, egalitarian, and able to work with values and systemic issues. They will also need to go beyond producing knowledge about our world to generating wisdom about how to act within it. To get to envisioned systems we will need to rapidly scale methodological innovations, connect innovators, and creatively accelerate learning about working with intractable challenges. We will also need to create new funding schemes, a global knowledge commons, and challenge deeply held assumptions. To genuinely be a creative force in supporting longevity of human and non-human life on our planet, the shift in knowledge systems will probably need to be at the scale of the enlightenment and speed of the scientific and technological revolution accompanying the second World War. This will require bold and strategic action from governments, scientists, civic society and sustained transformational intent. (shrink)

Building on Merleau-Ponty’s recognition of the mutually expressive relation between the body and the space it occupies, I borrow from queer and feminist phenomenologies to reflect on the spatiality of subjects constrained to heterosexuality – a constraint that functions as a common ground, always already present, of the kind that Merleau-Ponty argued was constitutive of subject/world relations. If it is the case, as many feminist theorists after Adrienne Rich argued, that the patriarchal norm orients us early on toward the (...) opposite gender, then there is much to be learned from studying the notion of feminine space and the erasure of the subject in this space -an erasure that has been largely discussed within recent feminist phenomenological work, notably in relation to the contrasting extension of men in space –, particularly as both are established in relation to male desire. Our aim is to argue that because it is temporal, and because it involves sedimentation and habit, the study of this orientational constraint through the lens of Merleau-Ponty could allow us to open up the future of gendered norms, and, through this, of gendered practices of sharing space. (shrink)

As radical feminists seeking to overcome the linguistic oppression of women, Rich and Daly apparently shared the same agenda in the late 1970s; but they approached the problem differently, and their paths have increasingly diverged. Whereas Daly's approach to the repossession of language is code-oriented and totalizing, Rich's approach is open-ended and context-oriented. Rich has therefore addressed more successfully than Daly the problem of language in use.

Deepfake technology presents significant ethical challenges. The ability to produce realistic looking and sounding video or audio files of people doing or saying things they did not do or say brings with it unprecedented opportunities for deception. The literature that addresses the ethical implications of deepfakes raises concerns about their potential use for blackmail, intimidation, and sabotage, ideological influencing, and incitement to violence as well as broader implications for trust and accountability. While this literature importantly identifies and signals the potentially (...) far-reaching consequences, less attention is paid to the moral dimensions of deepfake technology and deepfakes themselves. This article will help fill this gap by analysing whether deepfake technology and deepfakes are intrinsically morally wrong, and if so, why. The main argument is that deepfake technology and deepfakes are morally suspect, but not inherently morally wrong. Three factors are central to determining whether a deepfake is morally problematic: whether the deepfaked person would object to the way in which they are represented; whether the deepfake deceives viewers; and the intent with which the deepfake was created. The most distinctive aspect that renders deepfakes morally wrong is when they use digital data representing the image and/or voice of persons to portray them in ways in which they would be unwilling to be portrayed. Since our image and voice are closely linked to our identity, protection against the manipulation of hyper-realistic digital representations of our image and voice should be considered a fundamental moral right in the age of deepfakes. (shrink)

This article addresses how bodily integrity has been mobilised in the context of genital cutting of male infants and the extent to which the concept is taken into account in legal decision-making in the United Kingdom. While bioethicists have debated whether interventions on children's bodies are more appropriately determined on the basis of hypothetical consent or in the child's best interest, it is clear that in law the relevant test is whether interventions are in the child's best interest. As the (...) issue of nonconsensual genital cutting of infants has become more contested, courts have been asked to adjudicate on the best interests of infants in situations where their caregivers disagree about procedures. Although this body of jurisprudence remains (surprisingly) small, in this article we argue that, while there are now discernible trends in such cases (e.g. deferring decision-making until the child has the requisite capacity to decide, engaging with certain human rights norms), too often judicial reasoning about a child's best interests remains largely empty of reasoned content, and in certain respects is regressing. Using the recent case of Re P to exemplify this logic, and drawing on our previous work advocating the value of embodied integrity, we argue that judges should adopt a more substantive framework of values in judging the child's corporeal and other interests in such cases. This would move best interests assessments beyond a mere formalistic exercise and lead to better reasoned legal judgements. (shrink)

Health‐care and public sector institutions are high‐risk settings for workplace bullying. Despite growing acknowledgement of the scale and consequence of this pervasive problem, there has been little critical examination of the institutional power dynamics that enable bullying. In the aftermath of large‐scale failures in care standards in public sector healthcare institutions, which were characterised by managerial bullying, attention to the nexus between bullying, power and institutional failures is warranted. In this study, employing Foucault's framework of power, we illuminate bullying as (...) a feature of structures of power and knowledge in public sector institutions. Our analysis draws upon the experiences of a large sample (n = 3345) of workers in Australian public sector agencies – the type with which most nurses in the public setting will be familiar. In foregrounding these power dynamics, we provide further insight into how cultures that are antithetical to institutional missions can arise and seek to broaden the debate on the dynamics of care failures within public sector institutions. Understanding the practices of power in public sector institutions, particularly in the context of ongoing reform, has important implications for nursing. (shrink)

La renommée nationale et internationale de Pierre Bourdieu lui est venue de la sociologie, une sociologie un peu particulière, dite " des élites ", ou plus communément, " de la domination ", au fil de laquelle il ne se fit pas faute de fustiger les représentants de celle qu'il appelait " La discipline du couronnement ", la philosophie. C'était là pourtant son terroir d'origine, sa formation première, et la seule dans laquelle il possédât un diplôme. Mais il ne voyait dans (...) ses anciens " collègues " que des lectors figés dans une position scolastique qui les éloignait des urgences du monde et du " sens pratique ". Pourtant, c'est à l'aide de La philosophie qu'il critique la philosophie, et vise à l'éduquer, qu'il forge les concepts majeurs de sa sociologie, comme l'habitus, la violence symbolique. Et l'enjeu de ses recherches est encore un enjeu philosophique, qui le rapproche de ceux qui ont voulu transformer le monde, au lieu de se borner à le penser. (shrink)

Marie-Sophie Caruel Articulé autour de huit chapitres, l’ouvrage de L.E. Tacoma sur les migrations romaines aborde les questions liées au genre aux chapitres sur la famille (chap. 4) et sur le travail (chap. 6). La place faite aux femmes demeure donc relativement modeste et assez conventionnelle même si les apports sur la question ne sauraient être qualifiés de négligeables pour un sujet longtemps en marge des études sur la mobilité. Le cadre théorique proposé dans cet ouvrage est celui d’une...

Arts-Based Thought Experiments is a highly visual offering that engages visual arts, photography, poetry, creative non-fiction, memoir and speculative fiction. In this novel book, the authors lean deeply into concepts of the imaginary, and through artful experiments with thought, trouble the tensions between the human, the posthuman and the more than human. In the Anthropocene, with its intractable challenges and cataclysms, engaging posthuman positions when thinking of learning in socioecological terms is paramount to human survival. In this sense, the arts (...) offer creative and critical thought for the possibilities of a post-Anthropocene earth. Contributors are: Raoul Adam, Marilyn Ahearn, William Boyd, Euan Boyd, Adrienne Brown, Shae L. Brown, Teresa Carapeto, Philemon Chigeza, Amy Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles, David Ellis, Katie Hotko, Marianne Logan, Ferdousi Khatun, Alexandra Lasczik, Yaw Ofosu-Asare, Maia Osborn, Marie-Laurence Paquette, Jemma Peisker, Ziah Peisker, Adrienne Piscopo, David Rousell, Benjamin Ryan, Billy Ryan, Lisa Siegal, Helen Widdop Quinton, Thilinika Wijesinghe and Tracy Young. (shrink)

Si l’histoire des sages-femmes est relativement bien connue pour les XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, grâce aux ouvrages de Mireille Laget et Jacques Gélis, en revanche, pour le XIXe siècle, elle reste en grande partie à écrire. La situation parisienne a fait l’objet du livre de Scarlett Beauvalet-Boutouyrie sur la Maternité de Port-Royal et aussi de la thèse de IIIe cycle sur les sages-femmes parisiennes de Danielle Tucat, malheureusement non publiée. Pour la France profonde, on dispose d’un article...

Desire After Affect offers a detailed analysis of the affective turn and its consequences for the humanities.

Jean-Luc Nancy is one of the leading contemporary thinkers in France today. Through an inventive reappropriation of the major figures in the continental tradition, Nancy has developed an original ontology that impacts the way we think about religion, politics, community, embodiment, and art. Drawing from a wide range of his writing, Marie-Eve Morin provides the first comprehensive and systematic account of Nancy’s thinking, all the way up to his most recent work on the deconstruction of Christianity. Without losing sight (...) of the heterogeneity of Nancy’s work, Morin presents a concise articulation of the organizing concepts, which structure Nancy’s body of work. The guiding thread is that of an essential rift at the heart of any “self” by which this self is exposed and relates to itself and other selves. Nancy’s ontology undercuts dichotomies between individual and community, interior and exterior, matter and spirit, thing and thought, not in the name of mere deconstruction, but in seeking to open a thinking of the “limit” or the “edge” as the locus of sense. While Nancy’s work has often been presented in relation to Heidegger or Derrida, Morin demonstrates the originality of Nancy’s work and argues that, despite the variety of its preoccupations and topics, it possesses its own rigorous internal logic. This book will be of interest to students and scholars of philosophy and related fields who seek a systematic and critical understanding of one of the most original contemporary thinkers. (shrink)

When it comes to financial management, it’s not always easy for researchers to follow the strict standards set by their institutions. But is a researcher who is “delinquent” in the eyes of the system necessarily unethical?

Presentation, par Marie-Helene Cotoni Parcours critique : une anthologie R. Pomeau : Histoire d'une oeuvre de Voltaire : le Dictionnaire philosophique portatif Y. Florenne : Voltaire, ou de la raison et de la deraison par alphabet Etiemble : Preface au Dictionnaire philosophique R. Pomeau : La documentation de Voltaire dans le Dictionnaire philosophique J. Cazeneuve : La philosophie de Voltaire d'apres le Dictionnaire philosophique J.Deprun : Le Dictionnaire philosophique et Malebranche M. Delon : Voltaire entre le continu et le (...) discontinu A. Becq : Le "catechisme chinois" Ch. Mervaud : Philosophie et ecriture breve : le Dictionnaire philosophique portatif R. Desne : Voltaire etait-il antisemite? J.-M. Moureaux : Ordre et desordre dans le Dictionnaire philosophique M.-H. Cotoni : Voltaire et la Bible R. Granderoute : Le Bestiaire du Dictionnaire philosophique portatif Ch. Mervaud : Les cannibales sont parmi nous. L'article Anthropophages du Dictionnaire philosophique P. Retat : Le Dictionnaire philosophique de Voltaire : concept et discours du dictionnaire Bibliographie. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:720 Feminist Studies 42, no. 3. © 2016 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Julie R. Enszer “She Who Shouts Gets Heard!”: Counting and Accounting for Women Writers in Literary Grants and Norton Anthologies In 1979, the Coordinating Council of Literary Magazines (CCLM), a New York-based nonprofit that supported literary magazines through technical assistance and grant-making, announced a new program: CCLM editor fellowships.1 Editor fellowships came with a $5,000 grant. Members (...) of the literary community nominated editors to CCLM for the award. Adrienne Rich nominated Ellen Marie Bissert, editor of the feminist journal 13th Moon, and Mab Segrest, editor of Feminary: A Feminist Journal for the South Emphasizing the Lesbian Vision, for the editor fellowships. In 1979, the inaugural year of the prize, among the ten winners, not one was a woman. Bissert was one of three honorable mentions. Bissert rejected the distinction with a public letter to Maureen Owen, the only woman on the CCLM board of directors. Bissert deplored “the sexism inherent in the panelists’ decisions.”2 Several feminist publications reprinted Bissert’s letter while “the male small press gave it scant 1. The work of CCLM continues today, although now the organization is called the Council for Literary Magazines and Presses (CLMP). Under the leadership of Jeffrey Lependorf, the nonprofit organization continues to be a vital advocate for small magazines and publishers. 2. Open letter from Ellen Marie Bissert to Maureen Owen, June 28, 1980, CCLM Editors’ Grant 1980 folder, box 6, 13th Moon records, New York Public Library, Rare Books and Manuscripts Division (hereafter, CCLM folder). Julie R. Enszer 721 coverage.”3 As a result of Bissert’s objections, CCLM released the application statistics: 225 people were nominated, forty (18%) were women, and fifteen (7%) were non-white men. Of the 124 people who completed the applications, twenty-three (19%) were women and eleven (9%) were nonwhite men. There were thirty-three semifinalists, five (15%) women and four (12%) non-white men. These numbers shocked and outraged Bissert and other feminists. Adrienne Rich wrote to Maureen Owen, “I am appalled by the blatant sexism evidenced in the Council’s decision to fund ten male editors.”4 The attention that Bissert brought to the grant process resulted in a special meeting of the CCLM board to “discuss the controversy” and the awards.5 The next year, the CCLM editor fellowships went to five journals run by women and five run by men; one of the winners of the $5,000 award in 1980 was the editorial collective of Conditions, a magazine of writing by women with an emphasis on writing by lesbians.6 In a letter to readers of Conditions, the three editors, Elly Bulkin, Jan Clausen, and Rima Shore, noted that the “feminist protest following the announcement of the 1979 awards no doubt had an impact on the decision-making process” and that the award “represents the only substantial payment we have received, or seem likely to receive, for our editorial work, and we were greatly encouraged by it.”7 Maureen Owen acknowledged the importance of Bissert’s protests saying it “strengthened my position on the board at CCLM and the position of women editors and writers in general. She who shouts, get heard!”8 In 1979, Bissert, Rich, and other feminists demonstrated the importance of shouting about the inclusion of women in systems of literary appraisal; they recognized the important economic consequences of grants for feminist publishers and feminist authors. Thirty years later, in 2009, Cate Marvin and Erin Belieu founded VIDA: Women in Literary Arts to promote “conversations regarding the critical reception 3. Open letter from Bissert to Owen. 4. Rich to Owen, August 7, 1979, CCLM folder. 5. Open letter from Bissert to Owen. 6. Press release, June 11, 1980, CCLM folder. 7. Elly Bulkin, Jan Clausen, and Rima Shore, Conditions 7, unnumbered front matter. 8. Postcard from Owen to Bissert, undated, CCLM folder. 722 Julie R. Enszer of women’s creative writing in our current culture.”9 Each February or March since 2010, VIDA releases “the count”: a compilation of the gender breakdown of prizes, reviews, and literary journals in the United States. VIDA’s numbers demonstrate bias toward men in... (shrink)

Farrell, Marie T Review(s) of: How to read a graveyard: Journeys in the company of the dead, by Peter Stanford (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp.263, $32.95.

1 Timothy and the Pastoral Letters appear to be efforts to codify structure and roles in the early church. These efforts largely reflected the patriarchal social structures of the time and as such are not relevant to the twenty-first-century church. But some of the concerns identified herein, for example expectations of church leaders, are useful for a current discussion. What is missing is any acknowledgement of the potential for identified church leaders to take advantage of vulnerable congregants, particularly women and (...) children. How might the writer of 1 Timothy have addressed this serious problem in the churches? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:FOR A NON-VIOLENT ACCORD: EDUCATING THE PERSON Marie-Louise Martinez Education has been criticized, no doubt justly, for the symbolic violence of its prohibitions and exclusionary rituals that mirror the violence of society (Bourdieu, etc.). But this criticism is short-sighted. When restraints are removed in teaching and education (in the family and in the school), violence wells up anew and produces at least the following two results: access to (...) meaning and knowledge is restricted; access to the law and its structure-inducing prohibitions is restricted. The result is that we foster vulnerable personalities who confuse fiction and reality, and who do not hesitate to turn their violence into acts of hostility directed toward themselves, other people, and society. A further consequence has been a certain violent non-differentiation that has tended in turn to produce a violent re-differentiation ofsociety. There is a nostalgia everywhere today for a return to discipline, to the rule oflaw, etc. One hears talk of the "sanctuary of the classroom" or again of the necessity of preserving a "symbolic cloister." We are not able, purely and simply, to feel remorse for having maintained the rule ofa violent symbolic order. One might ask in what the symbolic consists. How is it connected to teaching and education? Is there not a fundamental violence in the symbolic? Does there exist a less violent symbolic, or even a non-violent one? How might one define it and put it to work in teaching and education? Girardian theory can help us to reinterpret various contributions from a number of authors in the human sciences (Benveniste, Lacan, etc.) and from the personalist philosophy of language. I would like to propose the hypothesis that there are two stages ofthe symbolic: first, a violent symbolic accord and, second, a non-violent threshold within the symbolic, which alone can serve as an appropriate model for teaching and education. 56Marie-Louise Martinez I. The symbolic and its powers. We are not using symbolic in its specific sense as metaphorical or figurative language as it occurs in myth and poetry but in a more general sense, i.e., to refer to the totality ofthe sign and code systems employed by human beings, as that which allows for the production and deployment of significations within society. Stemming from the Greek symbolein (to throw or put together, to assemble), the symbolic is that type or order of signs that assembles. Much more than the pure language of linguistics, the symbolic is the totality ofverbal, non-verbal, and para-verbal conventions, of systems ofexchange, and ofrites. It also comprises the regulated use ofbodies and ofnature. Our definition ofthe symbolic is not idealist: more than simply the expression of ideas, it is also interaction and action, on oneself, on others, and the world. It includes technical and bodily activities to the degree that these have been codified. In this sense, the symbolic (in agreement with philosophers as diverse as Cassirer or Clifford Geertz) can be said to embrace the totality of what is called culture. But ifthe symbol throws orputs together, it is necessary to discuss what and why and how it does so. The modern science ofsigns (semiology) has shown that the sign or symbol serves to place in relation. Relying on the contemporary semiology that stems from the American philosopher Pierce, and also on the work of Francis Jacques in France, we can say that this relation, far from being a simple binary one (sign/referent or sign/signifier) is a complex relation which aligns signs with the objects to which they refer, but also with the people deploying those signs. This latter signifying relation, which is intersubjective and social, was invisible in Saussurean semiology. In itself, the symbolic is the product of a complex relation which links people among themselves and the things referred to by the agency of signs. In other words, the basis of the signifying relationship is not the dyad subject/object (relation to objects) but a triadic relation, subject/ subject/object (intersubjective and objectai). This triangular relationship, which traverses the intersubjective and the objectai, is a relationship of convention, underlined in antiquity by Plato in the Cratylus (for Hermogenes, a word... (shrink)

The development of research ethics in the college environment raises specific concerns given the particularities of this environment. This study focuses on three priority issues for the college research ethics community: 1) the question of resources for ethics review by college network research ethics boards; 2) the review of multi-jurisdictional research projects; and 3) the review of student course-based research activities. In order to sound out this community on its concrete realities with regard to these issues, we carried out a (...) mixed real time Delphi study using the Surveylet platform, during which we engaged 31 panelists in dialogue over a total period of five weeks. This article presents the results of our statistical and thematic analysis of the responses obtained, the main consensuses and dissensus identified on the three issues, as well as possible solutions to overcome these issues inspired by the panelists’ proposals. (shrink)

Being a responsible person -- Qualities of a responsible person -- Being responsible at school and home -- Being responsible at work and with money -- Being responsible on the internet -- Responsibility for others -- Altruism : the ultimate in responsibility -- Keeping government responsible -- Responsibility to self.

Originally presented as the author's thesis, Paris-Sorbonne, 1974.

Dans sa clinique, l’auteur, psychothérapeute, a souvent eu l’impression que les récits de rêves étayaient le travail. Dans une thérapie de couple, le récit de rêve constitue déjà un début d’élaboration, et le groupe thérapeutique accompagne et transforme ce travail pour l’articuler à la problématique du couple.

This article presents the results of qualitative research conducted with 16 kindergarten teachers. The overall goal was to identify the perceived priority in-service training needs related to the development of social-emotional competencies. To further explore the data collected, the teachers were interviewed in a semi-structured format. The results reveal, among other things, needs related to relational skills, one of the areas identified in several works of the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning [CASEL] (Zins et al., 2004). These results (...) will make it possible to formulate hypotheses for reflection and action that can be implemented in the context of the in-service training of kindergarten teachers, in order to ensure not only their well-being, but above all, positive interpersonal relationships with all the partners involved in this so-called relational work. (shrink)

In his 1939 essay, “Some Questions on Dewey’s Aesthetics,” Stephen Pepper gave the following assessment of Dewey’s Art as Experience of 1934: “We are deprived of a pragmatic theory of ugliness” because Dewey “was reverting to Hegelianism in his later years.” By ‘Hegelianism’ Pepper meant the Second Oxford Hegelianism of Bernard Bosanquet. Similarly, Dale Jacquette wrote in 1984 that “nothing is ugly” in Bosanquet’s Three Lectures on Aesthetics, a work that Jacquette sees as bearing the influence of Hegel. But neither (...) critic has taken into account the following: Hegel and Bosanquet both employ an aesthetic-technical as well as a conventional concept of ‘beauty.’ In order to call an artwork ‘aesthetically excellent,’ both thinkers refer to artwork in an aesthetic-technical sense as ‘beautiful artwork.’ However, artworks that are beautiful in the aesthetic-technical sense can be ugly in the conventional sense. In order to evaluate the potential of a Hegelian aesthetic of the ugly, a distinction must be made between the aesthetic-technical and the conventional use of the terms ‘beautiful’ and ‘ugly’ in both Hegel and Bosanquet. And this the early Bosanquet — i.e., the Bosanquet of the 1892 A History of Aesthetic — did not see in Hegel. (shrink)